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#### Contention 1 is the Status Quo

#### US detention policy is an act of Islamophobia informed by a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice

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[October 04, 2012, Theresa Koenigsknecht is Public History MA Candidate at Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis, “Perspectives on Post 9/11 Prejudices: Islamophobia”, http://blog.gitmomemory.org/2012/10/04/perspectives-on-post-911-prejudices-islamophobia/]

Have the September 11th terrorist attacks changed how you view or treat others? For many, unfortunately, the answer is probably “yes.” The events of 9/11, the United States government’s response to them, and an increasing public misunderstanding of Islam have created a culture of collective suspicion and prejudice towards Muslims (or those perceived to be Muslim). This “unfounded fear of and hostility towards Islam” is popularly known as “Islamophobia.” Whether this attitude occurs intentionally or subconsciously, this mindset has resulted in intensifying stereotypes, hate crimes, discrimination and often condones the violation of civil rights of Muslim-Americans. The Muslim community’s response to the 9/11 attacks, both initially and today, remains remarkably patriotic and supports cooperation with government authorities. Yet immediately following 9/11, Muslim-Americans, as well as those perceived to be Muslims, often endured increased suspicion from other Americans and even experienced physical violence, supposedly in retaliation for the attacks. Over a decade later, Muslims are still subjected to hate crimes, workplace discrimination, unreasonable arrest and detention, passenger profiling, verbal (especially through hate mail and internet outlets) and physical harassment and abuse. Although racism and anti-Semitism are considered socially unacceptable, ethnic profiling against Muslim-Americans is often encouraged and accepted by government authorities and popular media. Fortunately, some people are actively working to counter the rise of Islamophobia and many communities have come together showing solidarity and interfaith cooperation with their Muslim neighbors. Anyone can take steps to defeat Islamophobia by encouraging empathy for others and participating in activities that promote discussion between people of different faiths and ethnicities. More information on countering Islamophobia can be found on The Muslim Public Affairs Council website which provides helpful resources, links and workshops. It is efforts such as these that can help create an atmosphere of trust and dialogue, as opposed to fear and misunderstanding. So what does Islamophobia have to do with Guantánamo? Muslims constitute almost all of those detained there since 9/11. For that reason, although Guantánamo may not figure largely in the minds of some Americans, Islamophobia strongly influences Western culture and plays a large part in what Americans do understand about Guantánamo and its detainees. To many American’s the prevalent misconception that Islam is equivalent with terrorism unfortunately justifies the violation of Muslim’s civil liberties in the United States as well as violations of detainees’ human rights at Guantánamo. Yet, the American Civil Liberties Union’s “A Call to Courage” report states that, “by allowing and in some cases actively encouraging the fear of terrorism to divide Americans by religion, race, and belief, our political leaders are fracturing this nation’s greatest strength: its ability to integrate diverse strands into a unified whole on the basis of shared, pluralistic, democratic values.” Remembering each person’s right to civil liberties and advocating for greater awareness and knowledge can persuade people to reconsider how they view or treat those around them and in time provide an antidote for Islamophobia.

#### These constructions create a broader state of violence against Islamic bodies and bodies that are racially marked to look like them—this manifests itself in xenophobic profiling and immigration policies

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[Spring 2003, Adrien Katherine Wing is a Bessie Dutton Murray Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Iowa College of Law. A.B. Princeton, 1978; M.A. UCLA, 1979; J.D. Stanford, 1982. This paper was presented at the Civil Rights symposium of the Louisiana State“Civil Rights in the Post 911 World: Critical Race Praxis, Coalition Building, and the War on Terrorism”, <http://digitalcommons.law.lsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5987&context=lalrev&sei-redir=1&referer=http%3A%2F%2Fscholar.google.com%2Fscholar%3Fq%3Dguantanamo%2B%2522critical%2Brace%2Btheory%2522%26btnG%3D%26hl%3Den%26as_sdt%3D0%252C5%26as_vis%3D1#search=%22guantanamo%20critical%20race%20theory%22>, 63 La. L. Rev. (2003)]

To illustrate how race can be socially constructed, I will use myself as an example. In the United States, I am considered African American or Black American, with the defacto second class status that designation still implies. My parents and grandparents were all considered Black, even though some of them had very light skin. The most recent white person whom we can determine is an ancestor is my great-great grandfather, Confederate General Pierre Gustave Toutant Beauregard.35 We even have members of the African American group who look white, yet are still considered part of the Black group. In South Africa, where I have taught many times, I was considered part of the historically mixed race group known as Coloured, due to my light skin, wavy hair and other characteristics. 7 During the apartheid era, this group had a buffer status between the de jure most privileged whites and the least privileged black Africans.3 " In Brazil, I learned that my same features would classify me as White, with all the defacto privileges that the designation still brings in that society.39 The pan-ethnicity term "Arab" and the religious signifier "Muslim" have been socially constructed as a synonymous "race" in the United States.4° While there are over 1.2 billion Muslims worldwide, only 15% are Arab.41 In the U.S., it is unclear, but there maybe between 4-8 million Muslims, of whom 22.4% are U.S. born and 23.8% are African American.42 There may be 3 million Arabs in the U.S., originating from 22 countries,43 and the Arab American Institute has revealed the little known fact that nearly three quarters of Arab Americans are Christians." In an important case, St. Francis College v. Al-Khazraji, the Supreme Court acknowledged that Arabs can be discriminated against on account of their race. Interestingly, those who merely look like Arabs or Muslims may be racially profiled on that basis as well. The double group can thus be considered larger than the number of actual members. According to one commentator, there may be, in this country, 7 million Arabs, 8 million Muslims, and 1.6 million South Asians, Latinos, and African Americans who could look "Arab," probably at least 10 million people,46 which I think even that is a vast underestimate of the numbers of the Blacks and Latinos in America who could pass as Arab. One African American radio personality stated that French citizen Zacharias Moussaoui, native of Morocco, who may have been the twentieth September 11 hijacker, looks like "a brother from around the way.' When my sons and I travel abroad, we are often mistaken for Arabs or Muslims. My partner James, who is a dark brown skinned Christian African American, often wears a kufi or skull cap to express his cultural affinity for Africa. He is always taken for a Muslim, although not an Arab. Sadly, I have told my NYU student son, who can phenotypically pass for Arab, that he has to be careful when flying so that he will not be mistaken for an Arab. Dressing in the popular ghetto styled baggy pants coupled with corn rowing his hair, and the use of an Ebonics dialect,48 helps ensure that he is not racially profiled as an Arab. Of course, when he lands in New York, his failure to be able to hail a cab indicates he is clearly seen as a Black - too risky to pick up.49 These two overlapping and socially constructed-as-synonymous groups, Arabs and Muslims, have come to be regarded in some of the negative ways that have historically characterized African Americans. While Arabs and Muslims are often stereotyped as dangerous, evil, sneaky, primitive, and untrustworthy, much as Blacks are, the criminality has a twist-they are considered potential or actual terrorists." They are forever "foreign, disloyal and imminently threatening,"'" whether they are citizens or not. Arabs and Muslims were racially profiled, victimized, and demonized as terrorists well before September 11 2 These activities have included: physical attacks by individuals and pro-Israel groups such as the Jewish Defense League; political attacks by pro-Israel lobby AIPAC and the Anti-Defamation League ofB'nai Birth, as well as many other Democratic and Republican Party affiliated entities; blacklisting of prominent Arab American intellectuals such as Columbia professor Edward Said and Harvard professor Walid Khalidi; as well as vicious stereotypes in films and television that would not be tolerated if used to characterize other groups.53 For example, Jack Shaheen surveyed a number of movies and found the following characterizations of Arabs and Muslims: "assholes," "bastards," "camel-dicks," "pigs," "devil-worshipers," "jackels," "rats," "rag-heads," "towel-heads," "scum-buckets," "sons-of-dogs," "buzzards of the jungle," "sons-of-whores," "sons-of-unnamed goats," and "sons-of-she-camels." 4 It is difficult to imagine the movie industry applying those sorts of labels to Blacks or Jews today. Arab American campaign contributions have been returned as if Arab citizens have no right to participate in American politics 5 3 Anti-Arab and anti-Muslim activities have intensified during periods of high tensions in the Middle East, such as the 1980 Iran Hostage situation, 1980-88 Iran-Iraq war, 1986 war against Libya, and the 1991 Gulf war.56 "The Supreme Court has upheld immigration laws discriminating against noncitizens on the basis of race, national origin and political affiliation that would patently violate the constitution if the rights of citizens were at stake."57 The cases include Harisiades v. Shaughnessy," Nguyen v. US.,59 Reno v American-Arab AntiDiscrimination Committee,6 ' Sale v. Haitian Centers Council, Incorporated,6 ' and The Chinese Exclusion cases.62 The plenary power doctrine has historically provided immunity from judicial scrutiny of immigration judgments, whether by Congress or the Executive branch. Many Americans assumed the Oklahoma City bombing of the Murrah federal building had to be done by Arabs or Muslims, rather than by white Christian militia member Timothy McVeigh.' After that incident, even though Arabs and Muslims were not involved, draconian immigration laws were passed in 1996 which singled out those groups. 65 Unfortunately, what happened to Arabs and Muslims under these 1996 laws was not unique. According to Kevin Johnson, these laws are part of a history of attempts to stiffle dissent that includes the Alien and Sedition Acts of the 1790s and the Palmer Raids after World War 1.66 In that period after the war, the U.S. imprisoned people for years for speaking out against the war effort.67 During the cold war Red Scare, many people lost jobs and were subject to investigation, or were even imprisoned, because of rumored association with the Communist party.6 According to Jerry Kang, "wartime coupled with racism and intolerance creates particular types of mistakes. Specifically we overestimate the threat posed by racial 'others,' in WWlI, Japanese Americans; today, Arab Americans, Muslims Middle Easterners, immigrants and anyone who looks like 'them . ,9, ? The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA)70 made it a crime to contribute to foreign groups deemed as terrorist, and created special deportation procedures, including the formation of special courts to evaluate secret evidence. 7 ' The Illegal Immigration and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA)72 supplemented AEDPA. That act prevents federal courts from reviewing a variety of immigration cases, with very limited exceptions. 3 These two laws "either explicitly-or according to INS interpretation, impliedly-authorize the use of classified evidence to exclude an 'alien terrorist' under special removal proceedings,74 to summarily remove an alien who is a 'national security' risk,7 and to deny bond to aliens in removal proceedings."76 Pursuant to these statutes, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) deported or attempted to deport more than two dozen people on the basis of secret evidence-almost all were Muslim, mainly Arabs. 77 Ironically, in 2000, Republican Presidential candidate George W. Bush accused the Clinton administration of racial profiling when it used secret evidence.78 After September 11 the situation affecting Arabs and Muslims dramatically worsened,79 and there have been profound effects on their civil rights.8 " Before that fateful date, 80% of Americans considered racial profiling wrong.8 After September 11, the polls reversed and 60% said profiling was fine, especially if directed against Arabs and Muslims. 82 U.S. Congressman John Cooksey of Louisiana likely expressed the sentiments of many when he stated on the radio, "If I see someone come in and he's got a diaper on his head and a fan belt around that diaper on his head, that guy needs to be pulled over and checked." 3 A survey done soon after September 11 said that nearly half would be in favor of having Arabs, including citizens, carry a special identification card.8 There were early reports that some Blacks and Latinos welcomed the law enforcement targeting of Arabs and Muslims.85 When I heard that comment, it reminded me that I preferred that my sons not be mistaken for Arabs when flying. On the other hand, I also realized that increased racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims has not meant that the long term racial profiling of African Americans has stopped. It merely means that my sons may be doubly profiled depending on the context. At the airport, they may be regarded as Arab terrorists, while at the taxi stand or ATM machine, they may be regarded as Black criminals.8 6 After September 11, Muslims and Arabs and people who look like them have been under siege." Over 1000 incidents of hate crimes were reported by February 2002.8 Even President Bush's Arab secret service agent was removed from an American Airlines plane. 9 Of five people who were killed, including a Sikh Indian, a Pakistani Muslim, an Egyptian Coptic Christian, and an Indian Hindu,9 none of them was a Muslim Arab, but all were socially constructed as such. The U.S. Justice Department opened up more than 380 investigations into violence or threats, which have taken the form of "telephone, internet, mail and face-to-face threats; minor assaults, assaults with dangerous weapons, and assaults resulting in serious injury or death; and vandalism, shootings, and bombings directed at homes, businesses, and places of worship."9 ' About 70 state and local criminal prosecutions were instigated against 80 defendants. 92 According to Bill Hing, Arabs and Muslims, whether citizens or not, are literally and figuratively being de-Americanized, which is "a twisted brand of xenophobia that is not simply hatred of foreigners, but also hatred of those who may not be foreigners but whom the vigilantes would prefer being removed from the country anyway."93 A member of the U.S. Civil Rights Commission has even said that in the event of another terrorist attack, the American government might consider interning Arab Americans,"4 reminiscent of the treatment of 120,000 Japanese and Japanese Americans in World War II.9 ' The legal position of Arabs and Muslims has especially declined since the exceptionally speedy passage of the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA Patriot Act),96 which subjects noncitizens to guilt by association, ideological exclusion, unilateral executive detention, and racial profiling.97 Aliens are deportable for innocent association, without any proof that they supported terrorist activity.98 Noncitizens are now subject to the resurrection of ideological exclusion, that is that they will be denied a visa on the basis of pure speech if they are seen as endorsing or espousing terroristic activity or persuading others to support activity or a group.99 Aliens can be detained without any hearing or showing that they pose a threat to national security or are a flight risk. The defendant in a normal criminal proceeding can be held without bail only if he is a danger to the community or a flight risk. " Aliens can now be held not only during the proceeding which can take years, but also afterwards, indefinitely, even if the proceeding says they should not be removed from the country!!lo Rules that effect citizens and noncitizens alike include the authorization of secret searches and wiretaps without any probable cause as would normally be required by the Fourth Amendment. 0 2 Under the USA Patriot Act, over 1000 people were held for weeks or months with no charges in mass preventive detention. 03 They did not have access to lawyers and, in many cases, their families were not told where they were."° Some people were held as material witnesses, i.e. they might have information. Even they have been treated harshly.'0 5 Some have challenged that detention in court. While federal judges have found that the use of material witness warrants to detain individuals for potential testimony before a grand jury is unlawful,'0 6 otherjudges have held the opposite. 1 7 According to Jerry Kang, [we] should not be surprised if courts determine that national security in the face of terrorism is-in the lingo of constitutional law- a 'compelling interest' and that rude forms of racial profiling, notwithstanding its over and under-inclusiveness, are 'narrowly tailored' to furthering that interest. It would be foolish to think that the courts will necessarily save us from the excesses of the more political branches, r' Little research has been done as to how all this has affected women in the Arab and Muslim communities, as many of the men detained were the sole or major breadwinners for their families as well as respected business owners, religious leaders, and community activists." These women are usually stereotyped as voiceless and passive, needing to be liberated from the all encompassing Afghanistan burqa or even the more modest varieties of head scarves many wear in the United States."' Some of them may not speak English, may not have been working, or even had a visa to work, if foreign born." In November 2001, the Bush Justice Department said it would interview some 5000 young men, solely based on age, date of arrival, and country of origin. Virtually all were Arabs or Muslims." 2 Some police departments refused to assist the federal government as they believed the policy constituted racial profiling."' They knew that law enforcement works best if it positively involves the community rather than terrorizes it."4 Needless to say, the affected groups have been outraged by the targeting."5 Some months later, the Justice Department announced it would interview 3000 additional men from countries with an Al Qaeda presence." 6 When the Justice Department announced the Absconder Apprehension Initiative in February 2002, they decided to prioritize the deportation of 6000 aliens out of the 300,000 foreigners who remained in the country after being ordered deported. Needless to say, these men were from Arab countries." 7 In April 2002, the Justice Department announced that it would put into effect a provision from IIRIRA, which gives the police the authority to enforce immigration laws."' This was controversial not only in immigrant communities, but with police concerned about racial profiling. "'We've spent decades establishing trust... with our very diverse communities,' says a San Diego spokesman. 'If there is an immigration emergency tied to criminal activity, of course we'll assist. But if it is simply an immigration violation.., we will not be involved.""" In June 2002, the Entry-Exit Registration System was established which now requires men from age 16 up, from 25 countries including nationals of Iraq, Iran, Libya, Sudan and Syria, to register and be photographed, fingerprinted, interviewed, or else be deported.2 Over 1200 men have been detained under this program.' For example, in December 2002, 400 men from Iraq, Iran, Sudan, and Syria were detained in Los Angeles under this program, and Amnesty International reported their harsh treatment included being shackled, hosed down with cold water, forced to sleep standing up, and kept from contacting family or legal counsel.'22 The Lawyers Committee for Human Rights has called for a dismantling of this registration system since it is "discriminatory in nature, ineffective and inefficient as a law enforcement strategy, and creates widespread ill-will in Arab American and Muslim communities across the country."'2 Of course, the inadequacy of all such profiling is shown by the fact that the airplane "shoe bomber" Richard Reid is a citizen of Great Britain;24 the "American Taliban" John Walker Lindh is a Muslim convert, white upper middle class native of Main County, California; ' 25 potential "dirty bomber" Jose Padilla is a Puerto Rican, former Chicago gangbanger; 12 6 and alleged twentieth hijacker Zacharias Moussaoui, who was captured before September 11, is a citizen of France.' 7 None of them would have been identified through profiling on the basis of nationality. It is interesting to look at the disparate legal treatment of these men. Lindh, captured in Afghanistan, got a public trial, whereas hundreds of foreign born Arabs and Muslims, also captured there, are being held in incommunicado detention in Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.'28 The President issued a military order that Al Qaeda members and other noncitizens could be tried in military tribunals or commissions without appeal to civilian courts, an action which has been heavily criticized by various scholars,'29 as well as our allies.130 At least two federal courts have denied habeas petitions filed by lawyers representing some of the detainees, refusing to assert jurisdiction over the cases. 13 1 There may be approximately 650 suspects from 43 countries in Cuba, and officials are preparing accommodations for up to 2000 inmates.13 1 Some scholars and government officials have suggested that detention and prosecution of captured suspects should not even be governed by international law. 1 3 Harvard law professor Alan Dershowitz and others have argued that such persons could be tortured without violating any laws binding the U.S. 34 Padilla, also known as Abdullah al-Muhajir, is a former Chicago Latin Kings gang member who converted to Islam.' He was picked up by authorities as he returned from Pakistan and was allegedly planning to set off a dirty bomb containing radioactive materials. 36 He is now being held in incommunicado detention in a U.S. military prison as an "enemy combatant," without access to counsel or any court-military or civilian, and may never be tried. 1 37 In December 2002, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York judge Michael Mukasey issued a 102 page opinion affirming Padilla's right to consult counsel, but the government continues to resist the court's order. 38 Another U.S. citizen, Yaser Hamdi, born in Louisiana of Saudi descent, who was captured by Northern Alliance in Afghanistan, is also being held as an enemy combatant, after being discovered among the Guantanamo prisoners. 139 The U.S. government in both the Padilla and Hamdi cases is resisting petitions for habeas corpus and saying that courts should just accept the President's determinations as to their status.140 Ironically, putting U.S. citizens under military jurisdiction without access to legal counsel places them in a legal limbo where they have less rights than foreigners Reid or Moussaoui 14 1 In October 2002, Reid ultimately pleaded guilty and was sentenced to life imprisonment by Judge William G. Young of the U.S. District Court in Boston. 142 In Seattle last August, an African American thirty-six year old, Earnest James Thompson, now known as James Uj aama, was accused of lending assistance to Al Qaeda by founding a training camp in Bly, Oregon in 1999.43 He was also alleged to have run a militant Islamic web site in Great Britain, and was allegedly linked to Abou Hamza Masri, a London Muslim and alleged recruiter for Bin Laden.'" Investigators hope to "squeeze some information out of him, "and he is being tried in a civilian court.145 In March 2003, the INS was dissolved and folded into the new Department of Homeland Security along with 21 other federal agencies. The implications are ominous, as one commentator has stated. "Placing all of the INS's functions into a department focused primarily on national security suggests that the United States no longer views immigrants as welcome contributors, but as potential threats viewed through a terrorist lens."'146 At the time of this writing, it is alleged that the U.S. government has drafted in secret Patriot II, the Domestic Security Enhancement Act of 2003.147 The proposed law would authorize secret arrests, overturning the federal court decision requiring the government to release the names of all those detained since September 11. 148 Additionally, the law would permit the U.S. to extradite even American citizens for trial to countries with which we do not have extradition treaties, such as Saudi Arabia, Syria and Libya, which are well known for torture. 149 International and current U.S. law prohibit sending a person to a country where there is likelihood of torture. 50 Constituting a new level of invasion of privacy, a proposed Terrorist Identification database would authorize the collection of DNA of any suspect and of all noncitizens suspected of having an association with a "terrorist organization."'' The most extraordinary proposal would possibly strip Americans of citizenship as a form of punishment for giving material support to terrorist groups.15 2

#### Islamophobia shapes US foreign policy—notions of western superiority are a critical tool to drum up support for militaristic and elitist interventions in poor countries

Kumar 13

[09/11/13, Deepa Kumar is an Associate Professor of Media Studies and Middle Eastern Studies at the Rutgers University. She is the author of Islamophobia and the Politics of Empire and Outside the Box: Corporate Media, Globalization, and the UPS Strike being interviewed by Jessica Desvarieux, The Real News Network, “Twelve Years Post 9/11, Islamophobia Still Runs High”, http://truth-out.org/video/item/18759-twelve-years-post-9-11-islamophobia-still-runs-high]

KUMAR: Absolutely not. I think it is true that larger numbers of conservative voters are racist. They are racist not just in terms of their attitude towards Arabs and South Asians, but also to a whole host of other groups. So it's true that this idea sort of concentrated within those ranks. But in fact Islamophobia is far more systemic than that. That is to say, the idea of a Muslim enemy, the idea of a terrorist enemy is one that actually goes back a couple of decades but was brought to light after 9/11 by the political elite, by our political leaders. So in fact it is built into the system of U.S. foreign policy in this country. And to simply look at the far right and to ignore the fact that it has larger implications in terms of justifying U.S. foreign policy would be really to have only an incomplete picture of what is at work in this form of racism. DESVARIEUX: Okay. Let's talk about the mass media and how they depict Islam since 9/11. Can you describe for us how the mass media has depicted Islam? KUMAR: Well, basically, the trauma of 9/11, the fact that, you know, 3,000 Americans died meant that it enabled the U.S. media to actually draw on stereotypes that have been, you know, propped up by Hollywood, by the news media, and so on for a few decades before that. And that was the idea that these are crazy, irrational people. They are all apparently driven by Islam to violence. And so we should lock them up, we should be suspicious of them, we should detain them at airports, and so on and so forth. And so that's what you saw in the immediate aftermath of 9/11. And this show called 24, which your viewers may know, is--it's about a lot of things [incompr.] that it's about justifying the building of a national security state and justifying practices like torture and so on and so forth. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And also the story of the day, of course, is Syria, and everyone's attention is drawn to Syria. Can you describe for us just how does Islamophobia play a role in any of the arguments for intervention in Syria, really? KUMAR: Okay. It doesn't play a direct role in that. It is--the idea of humanitarianism has a long history in the United States. The idea that there are victims all over the world, that the U.S. government has then got to make war in order to, you know, somehow defend them, this goes back all the way to the Spanish-American war of 1898, which was supposed to be about rescuing Cubans. And similarly, you see these sorts of justifications given. You know, Vietnamese need to be defended. In Iraq, it was babies, apparently, who were being bayoneted in Kuwait, and therefore the U.S. needed to intervene and defeat Iraq in 1991. So this idea of humanitarianism has a long history within the foreign policy establishment. But what makes it particularly potent in this case is that after 9/11 what you see is the Bush administration projecting this idea of clash of civilizations, which is basically the notion that we in the West are democratic, we are rational, we are civilized, we are, you know, all things wonderful, and they in the East are barbaric, they're misogynistic, and so on and so forth, and therefore we have an obligation, what used to be called the white man's burden, to go off and rescue them. And so you see some of that language, which is the idea that Arabs cannot bring democracy by themselves, they cannot make change, and so we need to intervene. So it's a combination both of the victim narrative, which has a long history, combined with this language of clash of civilizations. DESVARIEUX: Okay. And how does this fit into domestic policy? How do they work Islamophobia into domestic policy? KUMAR: Right. I mean, the comparison I make in the book and that I'm actually working on in the next book is that the U.S. government, and U.S. imperialism in particular, always needs an enemy. That is, when there is no humanitarian cause, an enemy is an extremely useful way to justify wars abroad, as well as the policing of dissent at home. So, for instance, during the Cold War we had been menacing enemy of the Soviet Union, against whom both a hot and a Cold War had to be waged. And, of course, this justified, then, McCarthyism, because there's always a reflection of the external enemy inside, and these people have to be rounded up, blacklisted, and so on and so forth. So that's the logic back then, and, of course, it was entirely about a politics of fear. Today we have the same sort of thing. After 9/11, the war on terror comes into being precisely about fighting endless wars. Remember, back in 9/11 the Bush administration was going to start with Afghanistan, go to Iraq, and then Iran, Syria, and so on and so forth. It didn't work out that way. But the idea was to drum up this fear of this menacing terrorist enemy, which justified wars all over the world in order to gain the U.S.'s interest in [incompr.] particularly in the oil-rich region in the Middle East. You asked me about domestic politics. Always there was a reflection of the domestic in terms of the international threat. And so what you've seen is innocent Muslims--and often actually not even Muslims, people from the Middle East, North Africa and South Asia, some of them Sikhs, some some of them Hindus, some of them Christians, and so on, being racially profiled because that is the logic that comes out of this. I have a whole chapter in the book about how the legal system has been reworked so as to justify things like indefinite detention, things like torture, things like deportation. And, frankly, the infiltration of agents into our schools, into my school, into colleges, and so forth. So, you know, it's truly horrific the extent to which Muslim Americans and people who look Muslim have been demonized since 9/11.

#### We advocate a critical praxis centered on challenging islamophobic indefinite detention policies.

#### Centering our praxis in this space is key—interrogating islamophobia in educational settings is critical to establish a critical consciousness that enables larger political projects

Housee 12, Senior Lecturer in Sociology

[Jan. 04 2012, Shirin Housee works at the School of Humanities, Languages and Social Sciences, University of Wolverhampton, UK “What’s the point? Anti-racism and students’ voices against Islamophobia”, Volume 15, Issue 1]

Having reflected on the two seminar sessions on Islamophobia and the student comments, I am convinced that the work of anti-racism in university classrooms is fundamentally important. As one student said racism is real. Through racism people suffer physically, psychologically, socially, educationally and politically. Our work in university classrooms is just the beginning of this challenge against racisms and other oppressions. Classroom discussions and general teaching form a very important contribution to this work of anti racism in education. There are no short cuts or painless cuts; the work of anti-racism is a difficult one. As educators we should make use of classroom exchanges; students’ engaged learning could be the key to promoting anti-racism in our class. My goal is to teach in a way that engages students and leads them to reflect on the socio-economic political/religions issue s that surrounds theirs (our) lives. This article argues for making anti-racist thinking possible in class. The student voice, that critiques mainstream thinking as found in the media and elsewhere, is a starting point for this political work. I argue that teaching and learning in our classroom should encourage the critical consciousness necessary for pursuing social justice. Whilst I acknowledge the limits of doing anti-racist campaign in university spaces, I argue that this is a good starting point. And who knows, these educational exchanges may become (as with my own story) the awakening for bigger political projects against injustices in our society. In conclusion I endorse social justice advocates, such as Cunningham (cited in Johnson-Bailey 2002, 43) who suggest that educators re-direct classroom practices and the curriculum, because: ‘if we are not working for equity in our teaching and learning environments, then…educators are inadvertently maintaining the status quo.’ In conclusion I argue that a classroom where critical race exchanges and dialogues take place is a classroom where students and teachers can be transformed. Transformative social justice education calls on people to develop social, political and personal awareness of the damages of racism and other oppressions. I end by suggesting that in the current times of Islamophobic racism, when racist attacks are a daily occurrence, in August and September 2010 alone, nearly 30 people have been racially abused and physically attacked (Institute of Race Relations 2010). The point of studying racism, therefore, is to rise to the anti-racist challenge, and for me, a place to start this campaign is within Higher Education Institutions, optimistic as it might sound, I believe, as asserted by Sheridan (cited in Van Driel 2004) that: ‘Education can enlighten students and promote positive attitudes…. Education settings can be the first arena in which battles can be fought against Islamophobia. It is to education that our attention should be directed.’ (162)

#### Deconstructing and interrogating flawed assumptions behind Islamphobia is critical to establish a transformative and liberatory pedagogy that enables us as agents to challenge racist dynamics

Zine 4, Professor of Sociology and Equity Studies

[2004, Jasmin Zine is a researcher studying Muslims in the Canadian diaspora. She teaches graduate courses in the Department of Sociology and Equity Studies in Education at the Ontario Institute for Studies in Education of the University of Toronto in the areas of race and ethnicity, anti-racism education and critical ethnography., “Anti-Islamophobia Education as Transformative Pedadogy: Reflections from the Educational Front Lines”, American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 21:3]

As an anti-racism scholar and educator, fellow colleagues and I realized from as early as September 12 that there was an urgency to frame a critical pedagogical response to address and challenge the rampant Islamophobia affecting the realities of Muslims from all walks of life and social conditions. Among the most vulnerable were children and youth, who received little support from schools in dealing with the backlash that many were experiencing on a routine basis. Most schools were reluctant to engage in any response beyond the politically neutral arena of “crisis management.” Among the school districts that I was in contact with, there was a clear resistance to addressing or even naming issues of racism and Islamophobia. In fact, the discursive language to name and define the experiences that Muslims were encountering on a day-to-day basis did not even exist within the educational discourse. While schools were reluctant to name specific incidents as racism – part of an all-too-common denial – the notion of “Islamophobia” did not have any currency at all. In fact, it was not a part of the language or conceptual constructs commonly used by educators, even by those committed to multicultural and antiracist pedagogy. I realized the urgency to map a new epistemological and pedagogical terrain by creating an educational framework for addressing Islamophobia. Within the existing equity-based educational frameworks, one could find the conceptual and pedagogical tools to address issues of racism, classism, sexism, homophobia, ableism, and anti-Semitism. However, the discursive foundations for dealing with Islamophobia and the accompanying educational resources simply did not exist. Developing a new framework to fill this gap involved coining a new term: “Anti-Islamophobia Education.” Being able to name and define the experience of Muslims as the result of Islamophobia was critical to shaping the kind of interventions that would take place from a critical educational standpoint. Before outlining a methodology for conducting anti-Islamophobia education, it was necessary to develop some discursive foundations, arrive at a definition of Islamophobia, and create an understanding of what it was that we sought to challenge and resist. From a socio-psychological standpoint, the notion of Islamophobia is often loosely translated as an “attitude of fear, mistrust, or hatred of Islam and its adherents.” However, this definition presents a narrow conceptual framework and does not take into account the social, structural, and ideological dimensions through which forms of oppression are operationalized and enacted. Applying a more holistic analysis, far from being based on mere “ignorance,” Islamophobic attitudes are, in fact, part of a rational system of power and domination that manifests as individual, ideological, and systemic forms of discrimination and oppression. The idea that discrimination, be it based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, or religion, simply stems from “ignorance” allows those engaged in oppressive acts and policies to claim a space of innocence. By labeling Islamophobia as an essentially “irrational” fear, this conception denies the logic and rationality of social dominance and oppression, which operates on multiple social, ideological, and systemic levels. Therefore, to capture the complex dimensions through which Islamophobia operates, it is necessary to extend the definition from its limited conception as a “fear and hatred of Islam and Muslims” and acknowledge that these attitudes are intrinsically linked to individual, ideological, and systemic forms of oppression that support the logic and rationale of specific power relations. For example, individual acts of oppression include such practices as name-calling or personal assault, while systemic forms of oppression refer to the structural conditions of inequality regulated through such institutional practices as racial profiling or denying jobs or housing opportunities. These exclusionary practices are shored up by specific ideological underpinnings, among them the purveyed notions designed to pathologize Muslims as “terrorists” and impending threats to public safety. Understanding the dimensions of how systems of oppression such as Islamophobia operate socially, ideologically, and systemically became a key component of developing educational tools that would help build the critical skills needed to analyze and challenge these dynamics. From a discursive standpoint, I locate anti-Islamophobia education within a integrative anti-racism framework5 that views systems of oppression based on race, class, gender, sexuality, ability, and religion as part of a multiple and interlocking nexus that reinforce and sustain one another. Based on this understanding, I have mapped some key epistemological foundations for anti-Islamophobia education.6 This includes the need to “reclaim the stage” through which Islam is represented from the specter of terrorists and suicide bombers to a platform of peace and social justice. “Reclaiming the stage” requires adopting a pedagogical approach that shifts the popular media discourse away from the negative, essentialized referents and tropes of abject “Otherness” ascribed to Muslims. This move involves presenting a critical counter-narrative in order to reframe the Manichean worldview and “clash of civilizations” narratives typically being purveyed in order to present a more nuanced, reasoned, and critical perspective of the global sociopolitical realities that Muslim individuals and societies are confronting, engaging, and challenging. Another foundational aspect of anti-Islamophobia education involves interrogating the systemic mechanisms through which Islamophobia is reinforced, by analytically unraveling the dynamics of power in society that sustain social inequality. Racial profiling, which targets groups on the basis of their race, ethnicity, faith, or other aspects of social difference, and similar issues are major systemic barriers that criminalize and pathologize entire communities. In schools, the practice of “color-coded streaming,” whereby a disproportionate number of racially and ethnically marginalized youth are channeled into lower non-academic level streams, is another example of institutionalized racism. Negative perceptions held by teachers and guidance counselors toward racialized students have often led to assumptions of failure or limited chances for success, based on such false stereotypes as the notion that “Islam doesn’t value education for girls” or “Black students won’t succeed.” These negative attitudes are relayed to students through the “hidden curriculum” of schooling and lead to lower expectations being placed upon youth from specific communities.7 Developing critical pedagogical tools to analyze and develop challenges to these systems of domination is part of building a transformative and liberatory pedagogy, one geared toward achieving greater social justice in both schools and society. Another key goal of anti-Islamophobia education involves the need to demystify stereotypes. Since 9/11, renewed Orientalist constructions of difference have permeated the representation of Muslims in media and popular culture. Images of fanatical terrorists and burqa-clad women are seen as the primary markers of the Muslim world. Deconstructing and demystifying these stereotypes is vital to helping students develop a critical literacy of the politics of media and image-making. Critically examining the destructive impact of how these images create the social and ideological divide between “us” and “them” is important to exposing how power operates through the politics of representation.

**Finally, it is our obligation as subjects with the privilege to speak in debate to bring attention to Islamaphobic detention policies. These practices exist precisely because it’s something “out there” and it’s productive to bring the voices of those who can’t be here to speak for themselves.**

**Park 10**

[2010, James Park, “EFFECTUATING PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE IN ENDING INDEFINITE DETENTION: HISTORICAL REPETITION AND THE CASE OF THE UYGHURS”, 31 Whittier L. Rev. 785]

George **Orwell once wrote** in The Road to Wigan Pier regarding empire and the complicity of a nation that enjoys its fruits: For in the last resort, **the only important question is, Do you want the British Empire to hold together or do you want it to disintegrate**?... For, apart from any other consideration, **the high standard of life we enjoy in England depends upon our keeping a tight hold on the Empire, particularly the tropical portions of it such as India and Africa**. Under the capitalist system, **in order that England may live in comparative comfort, a hundred million Indians must live on the verge of starvation**. 128 **How the** old British **Empire relates to the detention of Haitians and Uyghurs at Guantanamo Bay involves the very question of conscious awareness and the difficulties in piercing the veil of physical and metaphysical detachment**. 129 **Descriptions of events transcribed through the filter of media form a buffer to action due to its intangible nature**-**there is an unreality to the medium of televisio**n where elements of reality that play across the screen can take on the discursive properties of the imaginary. 130 As a result, **there can be quiet and passive acquiescence when terms, such as, "exceptional," "unprecedented," and "the normal rules do not apply" are heard and used to form the exigencies and justifications for "intensive interrogation methods" and indefinite detention without charge.** 131 Spatial separation and isolation also create impediments to rectifying injustice. In the case of the Haitian refugees, service organizations had to go through the judiciary and spend years in litigation to gain access to the refugees at Guantanamo Bay. 13 In the case of Guantanamo Bay detainees caught up in the "War on Terror," there were explicated policies against denying access. 133 For instance, "[a] confidential 2003 manual for operating the Guantanamo detention center shows that military officials had a policy of denying detainees access to independent monitors" from the Red Cross. 134 In other words, those who had done no wrong were denied access and, as a result, justice. **The indefinite detention of the Haitians and Uyghurs and the years they have spent and are spending in extra-territorial detention can**, similarly, **be examined through the prism of "punishment" as there have been alterations to the order and methodology of punishment and incarceration over time**. 135 **Punishment has changed from something that was acutely visible to something that has become cloaked and secreted away**. 136 At one time, **the public spectacle of punishment took center stage** as a gory spectacle of physical pain. 137 These dramatic displays of "justice" provided all concerned with a specific role: The criminal to be punished acted as the star, the innocent public witnesses supplied the captivated audience, and the government authority directed this macabre melodrama. 138 These displays **were** therefore **meant to educate both the individual criminals living** (or in some cases dying), **as well as the watching public as to the concepts of justice and punishment.** 139 **These theatrics later gave way to a less sensational mode of education which focused less on physical torment** in pursuit of justice **and sought to internalize a sense of a moral code** in all individuals. 140 Thus, **what was once a passive group of mere voyeurs has been disbanded to become a cluster of individual productions**-**each person now internalizes and imagines the process of punishment through the censored lens of courtroom dramas and the scripted cinema of the prison yard in popular culture**, **rather than bear witness to the realities of society's retribution. This more sanitary, internal approach to punishment is particularly pronounced when examined in the context of the "War on Terror."** In this instance, **the institutions of punishment are not only removed from the public eye, but from the very soil of our nation**. 141 In point of fact, **Guantanamo Bay is based in a country where United States citizens cannot visit without obtaining a license through the United States government** due to a long-existing trade embargo which has only recently been revisited. 142 **Guantanamo Bay has been argued to be territory that is outside the bounds of United States' sovereignty**, thereby, **prohibiting detainees from invoking habeas corpus to challenge their detention.** 143 Proponents of this argument used the United States Supreme Court decision in Johnson v. Eisentrager, decided in 1950, which held that those detained in territories beyond the borders of United States sovereignty are unable to invoke the writ of habeas corpus. 144 Thus, Guantanamo Bay was argued to be the sovereign territory of the nation of Cuba as a convenient fiction despite the years of isolation between the two nations. 145 **This argument was shattered when the United States Supreme Court held that habeas corpus for "War on Terror" detainees was due in Boumediene v. Bus**h, decided in 2008. 146 Even **further tucked away from the public eye are the secret prisons-socalled "black sites"-instituted by the Bush Administration**, operating extra-judicially and containing the faceless "ghost detainee," subject to "intensive interrogation methods."' 147 **As the form of punishment and detention shifts further afield, it takes on a profound dimension of separation**. George **Orwell**, in the excerpt above, **was alluding to the natural tendency to accept the conditions with which people are presented.** **The automatic supposition that what may be taking placing is unjust and perhaps beyond the constitutional limits can be seemingly driven from conscious awareness by the public's separation from events and the lack of information**. As a consequence, **justice has proceeded at a slow, aggravated plod in rectifying wrong where**, oftentimes, **individuals are simply "released" quietly after years of imprisonment without the subject of their innocence ever being addressed.**

**2AC Museums**

**THEIR KRITIK ASSUMES THAT RACE IS NOT ALWAYS PRESENT—THE VERY ACT OF SILENCE IF WE WERE TO NOT SPEAK ABOUT RACE WOULD BE RACIST**

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This analysis of Helms’ opening argument illustrates how **the ideology of white privilege operates through rhetorical silence. Helms’ statement was an argument over the meaning of the UDC**—its members, its actions, and its insignia. **It was an ideological struggle to maintain silence about the members’ whiteness and its implications through a strategic use of gender.** Two key issues arise here. First, **rhetorical silence about whiteness sustains an ideology of white privilege.** Second, **intersecting gendered discourses work to preserve this silence**. **Helms’ silence about whiteness naturalized the taken-for-granted assumptions contained in his framework for understanding who is harmed by this decision. The “colossal unseen dimensions [of] the silences and denials surrounding” whiteness are key political tools for protecting white privilege and maintaining the myth of meritocracy** (McIntosh 35). This **silence is rhetorical and has important ideological implications.** Scott observes that **silence and speaking have symbolic impact and as such are both rhetorical**. When considering the dialectic of speaking and silence, he thinks of silence as the absence of speech. **Silence is active, not passive; it may be interpreted.** Furthermore, **silence and speech may be both simultaneous and sequential. The absence of speech about whiteness signifies that it exists in our discursive silences. It may often be**

 **intentional; it can be interpreted, and it can occur simultaneously with the spoken word. Whiteness’ silence is ideological because it signifies that to be white is the natural condition, the assumed norm**. Scott notes that **silences symbolize the nature of things**—their substance or natural condition. **Silences symbolize “hierarchical structures as surely as does speech**” (15). Indeed, **the very structure of privilege generates silences, and “ironically, the most powerful rhetoric for maintaining an existing scheme of privilege will be silent”** (10). Thus, **silent rhetorical constructions of whiteness like Helms’ protect material white privilege because they mask its existence.**

**Calls for change are the best means to celebrate life – inaction breeds resentment**

**May, Lemon Professor of Philosophy at Clemson University, ‘5 (Todd, “To change the world, to celebrate life” Philosophy and Social Criticism, Vol 31 No 5-6, p 517-531, SagePub)**

To change the world and to celebrate life. This, as the theologian Harvey Cox saw, is the struggle within us.1 It is a struggle in which one cannot choose sides; or better, a struggle in which one must choose both sides. The abandonment of one for the sake of the other can lead only to disaster or callousness. Forsaking the celebration of life for the sake of changing the world is the path of the sad revolutionary. In his preface to Anti-Oedipus, Foucault writes that one does not have to be sad in order to be revolu­tionary. The matter is more urgent than that, however. One cannot be both sad and revolutionary. Lacking a sense of the wondrous that is already here, among us, one who is bent upon changing the world can only become solemn or bitter. He or she is focused only on the future; the present is what is to be overcome. The vision of what is not but must come to be overwhelms all else, and the point of change itself becomes lost. The history of the left in the 20th century offers numerous examples of this, and the disaster that attends to it should be evident to all of us by now. The alternative is surely not to shift one's allegiance to the pure celebration of life, although there are many who have chosen this path. It is at best blindness not to see the misery that envelops so many of our fellow humans, to say nothing of what happens to sentient non-human creatures. The attempt to jettison world-changing for an un­critical assent to the world as it is requires a self-deception that I assume would be anathema for those of us who have studied Foucault. Indeed, it is anathema for all of us who awaken each day to an America whose expansive boldness is matched only by an equally expansive disregard for those we place in harm's way. This is the struggle, then. The one between the desire for life-celebration and the desire for world-changing. The struggle between reveling in the contingent and fragile joys that constitute our world and wresting it from its intolerability. I am sure it is a struggle that is not foreign to anyone who is reading this. I am sure as well that the stakes for choosing one side over another that I have recalled here are obvious to everyone. The question then becomes one of how to choose both sides at once. III Maybe it happens this way. You walk into a small meeting room at the back of a local bookstore. There are eight or ten people milling about. They're dressed in dark clothes, nothing fancy, and one or two of them have earrings or dreadlocks. They vary in age. You don't know any of them. You've never seen them before. Several of them seem to know one another. They are affectionate, hugging, letting a hand linger on a shoulder or an elbow. A younger man, tall and thin, with an open face and a blue baseball cap bearing no logo, glides into the room. Two others, a man and a woman, shout, 'Tim!' and he glides over to them and hugs them, one at a time. They tell him how glad they are that he could make it, and he says that he just got back into town and heard about the meeting. You stand a little off to the side. Nobody has taken a seat at the rectangle of folding tables yet. You don't want to be the first to sit down. Tim looks around the room and smiles. Several other people filter in. You're not quite sure where to put your hands so you slide them into your jean pockets. You hunch your shoulders. Tim's arrival has made you feel more of an outsider. But then he sees you. He edges his way around several others and walks up to you and introduces himself. You respond. Tim asks and you tell him that this is your first time at a meeting like this. He doesn't ask about politics but about where you're from. He tells you he has a friend in that neighborhood and do you know . . . ? Then several things happen that you only vaguely notice because you're talking with Tim. People start to sit down at the rec­tangle of tables. One of them pulls out a legal pad with notes on it. She sits at the head of the rectangle; or rather, when she sits down there, it becomes the head. And there's something you don't notice at all. You are more relaxed, your shoulders have stopped hunching, and when you sit down the seat feels familiar. The woman at the head of the table looks around. She smiles; her eyes linger over you and a couple of others that you take to be new faces, like yours. She says, 'Maybe we should begin.' IV I can offer only a suggestion of an answer here today. It is a suggestion that brings together some thoughts from the late writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty with those of Foucault, in order to sketch not even a framework for thought, but the mere outlines of a framework. It is not a framework that would seek to find the unconscious of each in the writings of the other. Neither thinker finishes or accomplishes the other. (Often, for example regarding methodology, they do not even agree.) Rather, it is a framework that requires both of them, from their very different angles, in order to be able to think it. My goal in constructing the outlines of this framework is largely philosophical. That is to say, the suggestion I would like to make here is not one for resolving for each of us the struggle of life-celebration and world-changing, but of offering a way to conceive ourselves that allows us to embrace both sides of this battle at the same time. Given the thinkers I have chosen as reference points, it will be no surprise when I say that that conception runs through the body. Let me start with Merleau-Ponty. In his last writings, particularly in The Visible and the Invisible, he offers a conception of the body that is neither at odds nor even entangled with the world, but is of the very world itself. His concept of the flesh introduces a point of contact that is also a point of undifferentiation. The flesh, Merleau-Ponty writes, 'is the coiling over of the visible upon the seeing body, of the tangible upon the touching body, which is attested in particular when the body sees itself, touches itself seeing and touching the things, such that, as tangible it descends among them'.2 We must recall this economy of the flesh before we turn to Foucault. There is, for Merleau-Ponty, a single Being. Our world is of that Being, and we are of our world. We are not something that confronts the world from outside, but are born into it and do not leave it. This does not mean that we cannot remove ourselves from the immediacy of its grasp. What it means is that to remove ourselves from that immedi­acy is neither the breaking of a bond nor the discovery of an original dichotomy or dualism. What is remarkable about human beings is pre­cisely our capacity to confront the world, to reflect upon it, understand it, and change it, while still being of a piece with it. To grasp this remarkable character, it is perhaps worth recalling Gilles Deleuze's concept of the fold. The world is not composed of different parts; there is no transcendent, whether of God or of subjec­tivity. The world is one. As Deleuze sometimes says, being is univocal. This oneness is not, however, inert or inanimate. Among other things, it can fold over on itself, creating spaces that are at once insides and outsides, at once different from and continuous with one another. The flesh is a fold of Being in this sense. It is of the world, and yet encounters it as if from a perceptual or cognitive distance. It is a visi­bility that sees, a tangible that touches, an audible that hears. Merleau-Ponty writes: There is vision, touch when a certain visible, a certain tangible, turns back upon the whole of the visible, the whole of the tangible, of which it is a part, or when suddenly it finds itself surrounded by them, or when between it and them, and through their commerce, is formed a Visibility, a Tangible in itself, which belong properly neither to the body qua fact nor to the world qua fact . . . and which therefore form a couple, a couple more real than either of them.3 For Merleau-Ponty, thought and reflection do not attach themselves to this flesh from beyond it, but arise through it. As our body is of this world, our thought is of our bodies, its language of a piece with the world it addresses. '[I]f we were to make completely explicit the archi­tectonics of the human body, its ontological framework, and how it sees itself and hears itself, we would see the possibilities of language already given in it.'4 This conception of the body as flesh of the world is not foreign to Foucault, although of course the terms Merleau-Ponty uses are not his. We might read Foucault's politics as starting from here, inaugurated at the point of undifferentiation between body and world. The crucial addition he would make is that that point of undifferentiation is not historically inert. The body/world nexus is inscribed in a history that leaves its traces on both at the same time, and that crosses the border of the flesh and reaches the language that arises from it, and the thought that language expresses. How does this work? V Maybe it doesn't happen that way. Maybe it happens another way. Maybe you walk into a room at a local community center. The room is large, but there aren't many people, at least yet. There's a rectangular table in the center, and everyone is sitting around it. A couple of people look up as you walk in. They nod slightly. You nod back, even more slightly. At the head of the table is someone with a legal pad. She does not look up. She is reading the notes on the pad, making occasional marks with the pen in her right hand. Other people come in and take places at the table. One or two of them open laptop computers and look for an outlet. Eventually, the table fills up and people start sitting in chairs behind the table. Your feel as though you're in an inner circle where you don't belong. You wonder whether you should give up your chair and go sit on the outside with the others who are just coming in now. Maybe people notice you, think you don't belong there. At this moment you'd like to leave. You begin to feel at once large and small, visually intrusive and an object of scrutiny. You don't move because maybe this is OK after all. You just don't know. The room is quiet. A couple of people cough. Then the woman seated at the head of the table looks up. She scans the room as if taking attendance. She says, 'Maybe we should begin.' VI Merleau-Ponty's discussion of the body as flesh is an ontological one. Although he does not see the body as remote from its historical inscrip­tion, his discussion does not incorporate the role such inscription plays. For a body to be of the world is also for it to be temporal, to be encrusted in the continuous emerging of the world over time. And this emerging is not abstract; rather, it is concrete. The body/world nexus evolves during particular historical periods. This fold of the flesh, this body, is not nowhere and at any time. It is there, then; or it is here, now. A body is entangled within a web of specific events and relations that, precisely because it is of this world, are inescapably a part of that body's destiny. As Merleau-Ponty tells us in Phenomenology of Perception, 'our open and personal existence rests on an initial foundation of acquired and stabilized existence. But it could not be otherwise, if we are tem­porality, since the dialectic of acquisition and future is what constitutes time.'5 The medium for the body's insertion into a particular net of events and relations is that of social practices. Our bodies are not first and foremost creatures of the state or the economy, no more than they are atomized wholes distinct from the world they inhabit. Or better, they are creatures of the state and the economy inasmuch as those appear through social practices, through the everyday practices that are the ether of our lives. Social practices are the sedimentation of history at the level of the body. When I teach, when I write this article, when I run a race or teach one of my children how to ride a bicycle, my body is oriented in particular ways, conforming to or rejecting particular norms, responding to the constraints and restraints of those practices as they have evolved in interaction with other practices over time. Through its engagement in these practices, my body has taken on a history that is not of my making but is nevertheless part of my inheritance. It is pre­cisely because, as Merleau-Ponty has written, the body and the world are not separate things but rather in a chiasmic relation that we can think this inheritance. And it is because of Foucault's histories that we can recognize that this inheritance is granted through specific social practices. And of course, as Foucault has taught us, social practices are where the power is. It is not, or not simply, at the level of the state or the modes of production where power arises. It is, as he sometimes puts it, at the capillaries. One of the lessons of Discipline and Punish is that, if the soul is the prison of the body, this is because the body is inserted into a set of practices that create for it a soul. These practices are not merely the choices of an individual whose thought surveys the world from above, but instead the fate of a body that is of a particular world at a particular time and place. Moreover, these practices are not merely in service to a power that exists outside of them; they are mechanisms of power in their own right. It is not because Jeremy Bentham disliked the prison population that the Panopticon became a grid for thinking about penal institutions. It is instead because the evolution of penal practices at that time created an opening for the economy of visibility that the Panopticon represented. When Foucault writes that. . . the soul has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power that is exercised on those punished - and, in a more general way, on those one supervises, trains and corrects, over madmen, children at home and at school, the colonized, over those who are stuck at a machine and supervised for the rest of their lives6 his claim is informed by four other ones that lie behind it: that bodies are of a piece with the world, that the body/world nexus is a temporal one, that the medium of that corporeal temporality is the practices a body is engaged in, and that that medium is political as well as social. The last three claims are, of course, of the framework of Foucault's thought. The first one is the ontological scaffolding provided by Merleau-Ponty. And it is by means of all four that we can begin to conceive things so as to be able to choose both world-changing and life-celebrating at the same time. VII It could happen yet another way. Increasingly, it does. There is no meeting. There are no tables and no legal pads. Nobody sits down in a room together, at least nobody sits down at a place you know about. There may not even be a leaflet. Maybe you just got an email that was for­warded by someone you know slightly and who thought you might be interested. At the bottom there's a link, in case you want to unsubscribe. If you don't unsubscribe you get more notices, with petitions to sign or times and places for rallies or teach-ins or marches. Maybe there's also a link for feedback or a list for virtual conversations or suggestions. If you show up, it's not to something you put together but to some­thing that was already in place before you arrived. How did you decide on this rally or teach-in? You sat in front of your computer screen, stared at it, pondering. Maybe you emailed somebody you know, asking for their advice. Is it worth going? If it's on campus you probably did. It matters who will see you, whether you have tenure, how much you've published. There are no Tims here. You've decided to go. If it's a teach-in, you've got plausible denia-bility; you're just there as an observer. If it's a rally, you can stand to the side. But maybe you won't do that. The issue is too important. You don't know the people who will be there, but you will stand among them, walk among them. You will be with them, in some way. Bodies at the same time and place. You agree on the issue, but it's a virtual agreement, one that does not come through gestures or words but through sharing the same values and the same internet connections. As you march, as you stand there, nearly shoulder to shoulder with others of like mind, you're already somewhere else, telling this story to someone you know, trying to get them to understand the feeling of solidarity that you are projecting back into this moment. You say to yourself that maybe you should have brought a friend along. VIII There are many ways to conceive the bond between world-changing and life-celebrating. Let me isolate two: one that runs from Merleau-Ponty to Foucault, from the body's chiasmic relation with the world to the politics of its practices; and the other one running back in the opposite direction. The ontology Merleau-Ponty offers in his late work is one of wonder. Abandoning the sterile philosophical debates about the relation of mind and body, subject and object, about the relation of reason to that which is not reason, or the problem of other minds, his ontology forges a unity of body and world that puts us in immediate contact with all of its aspects. No longer are we to be thought the self-enclosed crea­tures of the philosophical tradition. We are now in touch with the world, because we are of it. Art, for example, does not appeal solely to our minds; its beauty is not merely a matter of the convergence of our fac­ulties. We are moved by art, often literally moved, because our bodies and the work of art share the same world. As Merleau-Ponty says, 'I would be at great pains to say where is the painting I am looking at. For I do not look at it as I do a thing; I do not fix it in its place. My gaze wanders in it as in the halos of Being. It is more accurate to say that I see according to it, or with it, than that I see it.'7 It is only because my body is a fold of this world that art can affect me so. But this affection is also a vulnerability. As my look can happen according to a work of art, so it can happen according to a social practice. And even more so in proportion as that social practice and its effects are suffused through the world in which I carry on my life, the world my body navigates throughout the day, every day. I do not have a chance to look according to a painting by Cezanne very often; but I do encounter the effects of normalization as it has filtered through the practices of my employment, of my students' upbringing, and of my family's expectations of themselves and one another. The vulnerability of the body, then, is at once its exposure to beauty and its opening to what is intolerable. We might also see things from the other end, starting from politics and ending at the body. I take it that this is what Foucault suggests when he talks about bodies and pleasures at the end of the first volume of the History of Sexuality. If we are a product of our practices and the con­ception of ourselves and the world that those practices have fostered, so to change our practices is to experiment in new possibilities both for living and, inseparably, for conceiving the world. To experiment in sexu­ality is not to see where the desire that lies at the core of our being may lead us; that is simply the continuation of our oppression by other means. Rather, it is to construct practices where what is at issue is no longer desire but something else, something that might go by the name of bodies and pleasures. In doing so, we not only act differently, we think differently, both about ourselves and about the world those selves are inseparable from. And because these experiments are practices of our bodies, and because our bodies are encrusted in the world, these experiments become not merely acts of political resistance but new folds in the body/ world nexus. To construct new practices is to appeal to aspects or possibilities of the world that have been previously closed to us. It is to offer novel, and perhaps more tolerable, engagements in the chiasm of body and world. Thus we might say of politics what Merleau-Ponty has said of painting, that we see according to it. Here, I take it, is where the idea of freedom in Foucault lies. For Foucault, freedom is not a metaphysical condition. It does not lie in the nature of being human, nor is it a warping, an atomic swerve, in the web of causal relations in which we find ourselves. To seek our freedom in a space apart from our encrustation in the world is not so much to liberate ourselves from its influence as to build our own private prison. Foucault once said: There's an optimism that consists in saying that things couldn't be better. My optimism would consist rather in saying that so many things can be changed, fragile as they are, bound up more with circumstances than with necessities, more arbitrary than self-evident, more a matter of complex, but temporary, historical circumstances than with inevitable anthropological constraints . . .8 That is where to discover our freedom. IX And what happens from there? From the meetings, from the rallies, from the petitions and the teach-ins? What happens next? There is, after all, always a next. If you win this time - end aid to the contras, divest from apartheid South Africa, force debt-forgiveness by techno­logically advanced countries - there is always more to do. There is the de-unionization of workers, there are gay rights, there is Burma, there are the Palestinians, the Tibetans. There will always be Tibetans, even if they aren't in Tibet, even if they aren't Asian. But is that the only question: Next? Or is that just the question we focus on? What's the next move in this campaign, what's the next campaign? Isn't there more going on than that? After all, engaging in political organizing is a practice, or a group of practices. It contributes to making you who you are. It's where the power is, and where your life is, and where the intersection of your life and those of others (many of whom you will never meet, even if it's for their sake that you're involved) and the buildings and streets of your town is. This moment when you are seeking to change the world, whether by making a suggestion in a meeting or singing at a rally or marching in silence or asking for a signature on a petition, is not a moment in which you don't exist. It's not a moment of yours that you sacrifice for others so that it no longer belongs to you. It remains a moment of your life, sedimenting in you to make you what you will become, emerging out of a past that is yours as well. What will you make of it, this moment? How will you be with others, those others around you who also do not cease to exist when they begin to organize or to protest or to resist? The illusion is to think that this has nothing to do with you. You've made a decision to participate in world-changing. Will that be all there is to it? Will it seem to you a simple sacrifice, for this small period of time, of who you are for the sake of others? Are you, for this moment, a political ascetic? Asceticism like that is dangerous. X Freedom lies not in our distance from the world but in the historically fragile and contingent ways we are folded into it, just as we ourselves are folds of it. If we take Merleau-Ponty's Being not as a rigid foun­dation or a truth behind appearances but as the historical folding and refolding of a univocity, then our freedom lies in the possibility of other foldings. Merleau-Ponty is not insensitive to this point. His elusive concept of the invisible seems to gesture in this direction. Of painting, he writes: the proper essence of the visible is to have a layer of invisibility in the strict sense, which it makes present as a certain absence . . . There is that which reaches the eye directly, the frontal properties of the visible; but there is also that which reaches it from below . . . and that which reaches it from above . . . where it no longer participates in the heaviness of origins but in free accomplishments.9 Elsewhere, in The Visible and the Invisible, he says: if . . . the surface of the visible, is doubled up over its whole extension with an invisible reserve; and if, finally, in our flesh as the flesh of things, the actual, empirical, ontic visible, by a sort of folding back, invagination, or padding, exhibits a visibility, a possibility that is not the shadow of the actual but its principle . . . an interior horizon and an exterior horizon between which the actual visible is a partitioning and which, nonetheless, open indefinitely only upon other visibles . . .10 What are we to make of these references? We can, to be sure, see the hand of Heidegger in them. But we may also, and for present purposes more relevantly, see an intersection with Foucault's work on freedom. There is an ontology of freedom at work here, one that situates freedom not in the private reserve of an individual but in the unfinished character of any historical situation. There is more to our historical juncture, as there is to a painting, than appears to us on the surface of its visibility. The trick is to recognize this, and to take advantage of it, not only with our thoughts but with our lives. And that is why, in the end, there can be no such thing as a sad revolutionary. To seek to change the world is to offer a new form of life-celebration. It is to articulate a fresh way of being, which is at once a way of seeing, thinking, acting, and being acted upon. It is to fold Being once again upon itself, this time at a new point, to see what that might yield. There is, as Foucault often reminds us, no guarantee that this fold will not itself turn out to contain the intolerable. In a complex world with which we are inescapably entwined, a world we cannot view from above or outside, there is no certainty about the results of our experiments. Our politics are constructed from the same vulnerability that is the stuff of our art and our daily practices. But to refuse to experi­ment is to resign oneself to the intolerable; it is to abandon both the struggle to change the world and the opportunity to celebrate living within it. And to seek one aspect without the other - life-celebration without world-changing, world-changing without life-celebration - is to refuse to acknowledge the chiasm of body and world that is the well-spring of both. If we are to celebrate our lives, if we are to change our world, then perhaps the best place to begin to think is our bodies, which are the openings to celebration and to change, and perhaps the point at which the war within us that I spoke of earlier can be both waged and resolved. That is the fragile beauty that, in their different ways, both Merleau-Ponty and Foucault have placed before us. The question before us is whether, in our lives and in our politics, we can be worthy of it. XI So how might you be a political body, woven into the fabric of the world as a celebrator and as a changer? You went to the meeting, and then to the demonstration. How was it there? Were the bodies in harmony or in counterpoint? Did you sing with your feet, did your voice soar? Did your mind come alive? Did you see possibilities you had not seen before? Were there people whose words or clothes, or even the way they walked hand in hand (how long has it been since you've walked hand in hand with someone out in public?) offer you a possibility, or make you feel alive as well as righteous? And how about those people off to the side, the ones on the sidewalk watching? Maybe they just stared, or maybe nodded as you went past. Or maybe some of them shouted at you to stop blocking the streets with your nonsense. Did you recoil within yourself, see yourself as in a mirror, or as the person at Sartre's keyhole who's just been caught? Did you feel superior to them, smug in your knowledge? Or did they, too, show you something you might learn from? Are they you at another moment, a moment in the past or in the future? Are they your parents that you have not explained to, sat down beside, or just shared a meal with? That one over there, the old man slightly stooped in the long overcoat: whom does he remind you of? What message might he have unwittingly brought for you? And why does it have to be a demonstration? You go to a few meetings, a few more demonstrations. You write some letters to legis­lators. You send an email to the President. And then more meetings. The next thing you know, you're involved in a political campaign. By then you may have stopped asking why. This is how it goes: demonstra­tions, meetings with legislators, internet contacts. Does it have to be like this? Are demonstrations and meetings your only means? Do they become, sooner or later, not only means but ends? And what kinds of ends? In some sense they should always be ends: a meeting is a celebra­tion, after all. But there are other ends as well. You go to the meeting because that fulfills your obligation to your political conscience. Does it come to that? There are other means, other ends. Other means/ends. Some people ride bicycles, en masse, slowly through crowded urban streets. You want environmentalism? Then have it. The streets are beautiful with their tall corniced buildings and wide avenues. To ride a bike through these streets instead of hiding in the armor of a car would be exhilarating. If enough of you do it together it would make for a pleasant ride, as well as a little lived environmentalism. Would you want to call it a demonstra­tion? Would it matter? There are others as well who do other things with their bodies, more dangerous things. Some people have gone to Palestine in order to put their bodies between the Palestinians and the Israeli soldiers and settlers who attack them. They lie down next to Palestinians in front of the bulldozers that would destroy homes or build a wall through a family's olive orchard. They feel the bodies of those they are in solidarity with. They smell the soil of Palestine as they lay there. Sometimes, they are harmed by it. A young woman, Rachel Corrie, was deliberately crushed by a US bulldozer operated by an Israeli soldier as she kneeled in front of a Palestinian home, hoping to stop its demolition. To do politics with one's body can be like this. To resist, to celebrate, is also to be vulner­able. The world that you embrace, the world of which you are a part, can kill you too. And so you experiment. You try this and you try that. You are a phenomenologist and a genealogist. You sense what is around you, attend to the way your body is encrusted in your political involvements. And you know that that sensing has its own history, a history that often escapes you even as it envelops you. There is always more to what you are, and to what you are involved in, than you can know. So you try to keep vigilant, seeking the possibilities without scorning the realities. It's a difficult balance. You can neglect it if you like. Many do. But your body is there, woven into the fabric of all the other bodies, animate and inanimate. Whether you like it or not, whether you recognize it or not. The only question is whether you will take up the world that you are of, or leave it to others, to those others who would be more than willing to take your world up for you.

**Even in failure resistance to institutional oppression is important – it creates learning opportunities that setup future success**

**Bartkowski 13**, Senior Director at the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict

(Maciej, Recovering Nonviolent History: Civil Resistance in Liberation Struggles, pg. 339)

**With each victory – and failure – popular resisters lean from experiences of their own as well as those of others while international institutions, scholars, and trainers have transnationalized the knowledge of strategic nonviolent conflict through publications, workshops, and other educational initiatives**. The role and impact of these international actors is important, though it bears mention that it has always been the inventiveness and resourcefulness of the population itself that has driven civil resistance. **Dissemination of the knowledge of nonviolent resistance, combined with its skillful application to indigenous conditions, has been historically notable as a factor in the proliferation of civil resistance movements and subsequent academic studies and research. Gandhi learned, among others, from the Hungarian civil resistance of the 1850s** – 1860s **and the Russian Revolution of 1905.** Also **the Hungarian nonviolent struggle was an inspiration for Arthur Griffith, the leader of the Irish nationalist movement Sinn Fein, and the Finnish constitutionalists who resisted czarist Russia. The Russian revolution of 1905 created ripple effects of largely nonviolent popular uprisings in Russia’s near and far abroad.** As described in Chapter 8, **at the end of 1905, unarmed Iranians took to the streets and built citizens committees to press for constitutional changes, including a democratically elected parliament. At the same time**, as highlighted in Chapter 14, **the Russian part of partitioned Poland, awakened by the events in Russia proper, was soon engulfed in waves of workers’ and school strikes, demonstrations, political, and national rights, including the use of the Polish language in schools and public offices. The process of transnationalization of civil resistance practice and knowledge has continued during decolonization struggles in Africa where, among others, Ghanian and Zambian leaders** – see Chapters 3 and 4, respectively – **read Gandhi’s work and drew lessons from the Indian resistance against the British, including Gandhi’s idea to devise and lead their own independence campaigns. Decades later, sharing civil resistance experience across borders has been especially visible, first with the so – called color revolutions** (Serbia, 2000; Georgia, 2003; Ukraine, 2004) **and later with the Arab Spring**. **The transnational diffusion of civil resistance has also included specific methods adopted from the tactical repertoire of past victorious nonviolent struggles in other, more contemporary, conflicts with the goal of emulating earlier successes.** In November 2011, **for example, the Palestinian freedom riders, without required permits, boarded an Israeli public bus headed to Jerusalem and were subsequently arrested before being able to reach the city. By establishing a transnational and timeless linkage between their struggle and the famous freedom riders’ campaigns of the US civil rights movement against segregated buses, Palestinians sought to dramatize the discriminatory policies they face on a daily basis. Through the adoption of what are now considered legendary tactics from another historical struggle, Palestinians attempted to appeal to the conscience of the American public and strike an emotional chord with potential supporters in the United States, Israel, and other countries.**

The alt creates more ethical subjects that engage in better micropolitics – that’s the only productive strategy

**Chandler** **13** **– prof of IR @ Westminster**

(The World of Attachment? The Post-humanist Challenge to Freedom and Necessity, Millenium: Journal of International Studies, 41(3), 516– 534)

The world of becoming thereby is an ontologically flat world without the traditional hierarchies of existence and a more shared conception of agency. For Bennett, therefore, ‘to begin to experience the relationship between persons and other materialities more horizontally, is to take a step toward a more ecological sensibility’.78 Here there is room for human agency but this agency involves a deeper understanding of and receptivity to the world of objects and object relations. **Rather than the hubristic focus on transforming the external world, the ethico-political tasks are those of work on the self to erase** hubristic **liberal traces of subject-centric understandings, understood to merely create the dangers of existential resentment. Work on the self is the only route to changing the world**. As Connolly states: ‘To embrace without deep resentment a world of becoming is to work to “become who you are”, so that the word “become” now modifies “are” more than the other way around.’ **Becoming who you are involves the ‘microtactics of the self’, and work on the self can then extend into ‘micropolitics’ of more conscious and reflective choices and decisions and lifestyle choices leading to potentially higher levels of ethical self-reflectivity and responsibility**. Bennett argues that against the ‘narcissism’ of anthropomorphic understandings of domination of the external world, we need ‘some tactics for cultivating the experience of our selves as vibrant matter’. **Rather than hubristically imagining that we can shape the world we live in,** Bennett argues that: ‘Perhaps **the ethical responsibility of an individual human now resides in one’s response to the assemblages in which one finds oneself participating**. Such ethical tactics include reflecting more on our relationship to what we eat and considering the agentic powers of what we consume and enter into an assemblage with. In doing so, if ‘an image of inert matter helps animate our current practice of aggressively wasteful and planet-endangering consumption, then a materiality experienced as a lively force with agentic capacity could animate a more ecologically sustainable public’. For new materialists, **the object to be changed or transformed is the human** – the human mindset. **By changing the way we think about the world and the way we relate to it** by including broader, more non-human or inorganic matter in our considerations, **we will have overcome our modernist ‘attachment disorders’ and have more ethically aware approaches to our planet. In cultivating these new ethical sensibilities, the human can be remade with a new self and a ‘new self-interest’.**

**2AC Vampirism**

**The excuse that we can’t speak out of our subject position is a cop-out. There is no neutral position from which this takes place. Their self-effacing gesture reinforces privilege and only requires the subaltern to achieve political change**

**Kapoor, 2008** (Ilan, Associate Professor at the Faculty of Environmental Studies, York University, “The Postcolonial Politics of Development,” p. 45-46)

But **Spivak** is quick to examine the other side of the equation. She **reproaches Western researchers**/academicians **for** sometimes **too easily distancing them- selves from postcoloniality by uncritically situating the native informant as authentic** and exotic ‘insider’: **they say ‘“O.K., sorry, we are just very good white people, therefore we do not speak for the blacks**.” **That’s** the kind of breast- beating that is **left behind at the threshold and then business goes on as usual’** (1990a: 121). **By placing themselves as ‘outsiders’, they duck their own complicity in North–South politics**, often **hiding behind naïveté** or lack of expertise, all the **while congratulating themselves as the ‘saviors of marginality’** (1993: 61). **This inside/outside separation either helps contain and depoliticize ethnicity, or puts the onus for change** and engagement **exclusively on the Third World subaltern** (or on the native informant as its representative). Thus, for Spivak, **it is dangerous to assume that one can encounter** the Third World, and especially **the Third World subaltern, on a level playing field. Our interaction with, and representations of, the subaltern are inevitably loaded**. They are **determined by our favourable historical and geographic position**, our **material and cultural advantages** resulting from imperialism and capitalism, **and our identity as privileged Westerner** or native informant. **When the investigating subject**, naively or knowingly, **disavows its complicity or pretends it has no ‘geo-political determinations’, it does the opposite of concealing itself: it privileges itself** (1988a: 272, 292). **It is liable** (as discussed above and detailed further below) **to speak for the subaltern, justifying power and domination, naturalizing Western superiority, essentializing ethnicity, or asserting ethnocultural** and class **identity, all in the name of the subaltern**. In so doing, it is liable to do harm to the subaltern. As Linda Alcoff writes, ‘Though the speaker may be trying to materially improve the situation of some lesser-privileged group, the effects of her discourse is to reinforce racist, imperialist conceptions and perhaps also to further silence the lesser-privileged group’s own ability to speak and be heard’ (1991: 26).

**This solves – images can help galvanize critical public pedagogy if they are are combined directly with emancipatory, democratic goals**

**Giroux** 20**12**

/Henry A., One of the founding theorists of critical pedagogy in the United States, he is best known for his pioneering work in public pedagogy, cultural studies, youth studies, higher education, media studies, and critical theory. In 2002 Routledge named Giroux as one of the top fifty educational thinkers of the modern period, A high-school social studies teacher in Barrington, Rhode Island for six years,2 Giroux has held positions at Boston University, Miami University, and Penn State University. In 2005, Giroux began serving as the Global TV Network Chair in English and Cultural Studies at McMaster University “Disturbing Pleasures: Murderous Images and the Aesthetics of Depravity” Third Text, 26:3, 259-273, DOI: 10.1080/09528822.2012.679036/

This is not to suggest that aesthetic standards and values do not matter but to inquire how they come to function in the broader culture. **I am not suggesting that**, as a result of the symbiosis of the pleasure principle, the death drive and the spectacle, **any consideration of aesthetics simply adds insult to the portrayal of human suffering and** thus **has no place in** an **emancipatory** notion of **politics**. **Photographers**, as Mieke Bal points out, ‘**can deploy art not only as a reflection but also as a form of witnessing that alters the existence of what it witnesses**’.45 Bal also insists that **art can be used ‘to reconquer beauty [when] mobilized as a weapon against suffering’**, as represented by Nan Goldin's deeply personal photographs displaying the violence and aggression that marked her relationship with her lover. What is at stake with the rise of **the depravity of aesthetics is that it offers up representations of human suffering, pain and death as the ultimate repository of desire and pleasure**. This is not so much the beginning of a debate on the relevance of the aesthetic as much as a dialogue on the perversion of a formative culture that renders democratic society impossible, while also producing a depravity of aesthetics. This latter line of thought raises a different set of questions. **What forms of responsibility and what pedagogic strategies should one invoke in the face of a society that feeds off spectacles of violence and cruelty**? What forms of witnessing and education might be called into play in which the feelings of pleasure mobilised by images of human suffering can be used as ‘a catalyst for critical inquiry and deep thought’?46 **Responding** to these questions **would mean** not only **refusing to allow images to dissolve into a neoliberal pleasure machine by interrogating the crimes they portray, but also transforming the pedagogic function of a cultural apparatus that seriously limits and undermines any viable notion of aesthetics that might extend rather than shut down critical agency in the service of** a **democracy** to come. Rather than being reduced to a mechanism for the cathartic release of pleasure, **a society** saturated in the claims of poisonous violence **must** serve as an indictment, a source of memory and evidence of the need to **imagine otherwise**. In pointing to these photos and the culture of cruelty, I do not want to suggest that because neoliberal social formations appear to be winning in the United States they have already achieved victory, or that the struggle is over. I think it is too easy to slide from an analysis of such dominant forces to erasing the important point that this is an ongoing struggle operating within a number of different contexts, however uneven. As Larry Grossberg has pointed out: The fact that one can read for example a culture of cruelty off of various articulations does not yet mean that this is how people live their lives. The fact that the cultural discourses are all about markets does not mean that people live their lives with markets as the only definition/locus of value.47 These new social formations emerging within and across diverse contexts need a new language for describing the nature of such forces, their complexity and the different terrains on which they operate. What I am arguing is that analysing the aesthetics of depravity does not mean that such a project or social formation is an accomplished and sutured fact of domination, but to be properly understood must be located within complex and ongoing spheres of struggle. **In contrast to the ‘Kill Team’ photos, we have seen a radical cultural and perspectival shift** – or Arendt's ‘instants of truth’ – **sparked by images** from Libya, Syria and Iran in which the murder of young students and other protesters by state militia thugs have been **captured on video and circulated** the world over. The video **images** of the killing of a young music student, twenty-seven-year-old Neda Agha-Soltan, **helped to inspire massive waves of protests** in Iran that continue to this day. Similarly, terrifying images of the torture and killing of thirteen-year-old Hamza Ali al-Khateeb have spread throughout Syria, indicting the state security forces who murdered him. **Such images become a critical mode of public pedagogy capable of forms of witnessing that allow people to imagine the unimaginable**. What is emancipatory about these images, as Georges Didi-Huberman points out in a different context, is that **they work to refuse** what he calls **the ‘disimagination machine’**; that is, these are images that are ‘images in spite of all’, bearing witness to a different and critical sense of remembering and collective resistance.48 Such images do not feed the basest of collective desires and pleasurable fantasies detached from any real consequences. On the contrary, **such images of abuse and suffering have inflamed a society in which a formative culture exists that enables people to connect emotional investments and desires to a politics in which unthinkable acts of violence are confronted as part of a larger ‘commitment to political accountability, community and the importance of positive affect for both belonging and change’**.

**2AC Inaction**

**The excuse that we can’t speak out of our subject position is a cop-out. There is no neutral position from which this takes place. Their self-effacing gesture reinforces privilege and only requires the subaltern to achieve political change**

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**AT Vampire**

**Not vampiristic consumption**

Rosi **Braidotti 6**, contemporary philosopher and feminist theoretician, Transpositions: On Nomadic Ethics, 76

I beg to differ from Spivak's assessment. **The charge of vampiristic** or consumerist **consumption** **of others is an ill-informed way of approaching the issue, in that it ignores the rigorous anti-humanistic, cartographic and materialistic roots of poststructuralism**. **It** specifically **rests on a misreading of what is involved in the poststructuralist critique of representation and on what is at stake in the task of redefining alternative subject positions**. Spivak attempts to rescue Derrida, whom she credits with far more self-reflexivity and political integrity than she is prepared to grant to Foucault and Deleuze. The grounds for this preferential treatment are highly debatable. **Nomadic thinking challenges the semiotic approach that is crucial to the 'linguistic turn' and also to deconstruction. Both** Deleuze and Foucault engage in a critical dialogue with it and **work towards an alternative model of political and ethical practice. It seems paradoxical that thinkers who are committed to an analytics of contemporary subject-positions get accused of actually having caused the events which they account for; as if they were** single-handedly **responsible for**, or even profiting from, **the accounts they offer as cartographies**. **Naming the networks of power-relations** in late postmodernity, however, **is not as simple as metaphorizing and therefore consuming them**. In my view **there is no vampiristic approach towards 'otherness'**

 **on the part of the poststructuralists.** Moreover, I find that approach compatible with the emerging subjectivities of the former 'others' of Western reason. Late postmodernity has seen the proliferation of many and potentially contradictory discourses and practices of difference, which have dislocated the classical axis of distinction between Self or Same/Other or Different. **The point of coalition between different critical voices and the poststructuralists is the process of elaborating the spaces in-between self and other, which means the practice of the Relation. They stress the need to elaborate forms of social and political implementation of non-pejorative and nondualistic notions of 'others'.**

**Permutation: the affirmative and refuse using our narrative’s suffering for liberalism—there is nothing intrinsically bad about our representations—don’t throw out the baby with the bathwater**

**Chabot Davis 4**

[12/05/2004, Kimberly Chabot Davis teaches twentieth-century U.S. literature and film at Bridgewater State College. Used to teach 20th century American literature and culture in the History and Literature Program at Harvard University (fuck them). Chabot Davis's articles on contemporary culture have been published in Twentieth Century Literature, International Journal of Cultural Studies, Journal for the Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society, South Atlantic Review, Politics and Culture, and Modern Fiction Studies, “Oprah's Book Club and the politics of cross-racial empathy”, International Journal of Cultural Studies 2004 7: 399]

While some object to the sympathetic emotions on the grounds that they substitute for political action, **other** cultural **critics and** race **theorists treat sympathy as an inherently colonizing action, and they reduce empathy to an imperialistic drive to incorporate the other into the self**. While some of these critics are informed by postcolonial theories exposing the drive for knowledge of the exotic other as a form of power, **others are influenced by the Freudian view of identification as a hostile erasure of the other, ‘in which the object that we long for and prize is assimilated by eating and is in that way annihilated as such’** (Freud, 1955: 105; see also hooks, 1992). In critical race theory, studies of cross-racial sympathy take a decidedly pessimistic tone about the possibilities of coalition, which has the unfortunate consequence of reifying the very racial categories that they seek to undermine.10 For example, Robyn Wiegman despairs that integrationist novels and films are ultimately wedded to white authority, and concludes that ‘the transformatory hope of identifying with the pain and suffering of others seems ever more bound to an imperialistic cast’ (1995: 200). In researching her book Racechanges, Susan Gubar sadly concludes that crossracial masquerade and imitation ‘inevitably leads to the disappearance of the other’s otherness’ (1997: 245). While these writers take a despairing tone, Doris Sommer aggressively condemns cross-racial sympathy and empathy alike. Focusing on the narrative strategies that ethnic writers use to refuse access to white readers, Sommer dismisses the sympathy of white liberals as an ‘appropriation in the guise of an embrace’ (1994: 543) and a facile form of connection that lasts ‘hardly longer than the reading of a novel’ (p. 529). Arguing that ‘empathy is the egocentric energy that drives one subject to impersonate another’ (1999: 22), she echoes Freud’s view of identification as a metaphoric substitution of the self for the other. These writers shed light on a problematic possibility of sympathy and empathy – that the privileged sympathizer will ignore differences in his or her zeal to connect emotionally with the sufferer. Erasing the subjective experience of people of color, the white empathizer falsely claims someone else’s particular pain as his own. While **some critics focus on this desire for sameness as an erasure, others are more critical of the hierarchy they believe is implicit in sympathy’s operation**. As Berlant puts it, ‘**compassion is a term denoting privilege: the sufferer is over there’** (2004: 4) **and the observer has the power to either help or turn away**. I agree that sympathy may involve power relations between subject and object, and may keep hierarchies firmly in place by granting the sympathizer a feeling of benevolent largesse and by denying agency to the sufferer. **These consequences**, however, **are not implicit to the operation of sympathetic emotions**. **Empathetic experiences of seeing from the vantage point of another can lead to a recognition of that person’s subjecthood and agency, and can lead the white empathizer to not only become critically aware of racial hierarchy**, **but to desire to work against the structures of inequality wherein her own power resides.** My case study of Oprah’s Book Club addresses both the promise and limitations of empathy and sympathy, asserting that **the politics of these emotions depend upon how they are experienced and to what end they are employed**. While the possibility of appropriation is an important concern, **critics also have a responsibility to bring to light moments of empathy or compassion with progressive political significance, lest we lose hope in the potential for change in the racial order**. It strikes me as particularly ironic that these despairing conclusions are voiced by white anti-racist scholars whose own critical work attests to the radical potential of some acts of cross-racial affiliation. **In our zeal to avoid celebratory analyses that underestimate the power of white hegemony, we need to avoid throwing out the proverbial baby (empathy and compassion) with the bathwater.** As many social scientists have argued, **empathy can inhibit aggression, and the absence of empathy is a telling feature of inter-group violence**, such as the Israeli/Palestinian conflict.11 In the context of an alarming international rise in hate groups and terrorism**, left-oriented scholars cannot afford to give up on empathy’s promise of fostering cross-cultural understanding and desires for social justice and equality.** Reception analysis My reception study suggests that **sympathy’s colonizing functions and its ability to inhibit action are not intrinsic to its structure**, **but merely one possible deployment thereof**. By offering evidence here of the more radical possibilities of empathy visible on The Oprah Winfrey Show, I do not claim that the **critics of sympathy** are categorically wrong, but merely that they **are diminishing the complexity of the sympathetic emotions**. One could argue that **a similarly one-sided argument is put forth by** Martha **Nussbaum** (2001), **who** optimistically **implies that compassion is the cure for what ails modern society**. Predicated on the assumption that reading good books produces empathetic and moral people, Nussbaum’s philosophical reflections ignore the considerable diversity of reader responses to texts. My reception study, however, exposes both negative and positive strains of empathy and sympathy, while drawing attention to previously underappreciated progressive effects. While I do not claim that these radical deployments are predominant, either on Oprah’s programs or in the reading public at large, I found enough recurrence to warrant attention.